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Abstract—The number of secure data streams a relay-assisted
interference channel can support has been an intriguing problem.
The problem is not solved even for a fundamental scenario with
a single antenna at each transmitter, receiver and relay. In this
paper, we study the achievable secure degrees of freedom of
instantaneous relay-assisted interference channels with real and
complex coefficients. The study of secure degrees of freedom
with complex coefficients is not a trivial multiuser extension of
the scenarios with real channel coefficients as in the case for the
degrees of freedom, due to secrecy constraints. We tackle this
challenge by jointly designing the improper transmit signals and
widely-linear relay processing strategies.
Index Terms—instantaneous relay channel; widely linear; se-
cure degrees of freedom; interference neutralization; information
leakage neutralization; real interference alignment
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of secure data streams supported in a wire-
less system using purely physical layer security techniques
- as an ever increasingly popular topic - provides additional
protection to conventional cryptographic techniques. There
are several well-studied approaches to improve physical layer
security, e.g., artificial noise from helpers or from built-in
source signals [1], lattice code [2], interference alignment
with secrecy precoding [3] and neutralization [4]. In a single-
antenna relay-assisted interference channel with confidential
messages, we propose to apply the combination of interference
neutralization (by choosing the relay strategy smartly) and
real interference alignment [5], [6] which combines transmit
symbol constellation design and artificial noise transmission.
A. Non-trivial secure degrees of freedom in complex channel
The term real interference alignment is due to the applica-
tion of Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approxi-
mation in number theory on the estimation of integers (desired
symbols) from real numbers (received signals). An assumption
of real channel coefficients are conventionally assumed. If
the degrees of freedom (DoF) is considered, the scenarios
of complex channel coefficients can be straight-forwardly
extended from that of real channel coefficients. As the real
and imaginary parts of all transmitter-receiver pairs can be
paired up and the complex system is equivalent to a real system
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with double the number of transmitter-receiver pairs. However,
this is not the case if secure degrees of freedom (sDoF)
is considered. When sDoF is concerned, each transmitter
i’s signal should be protected from being eavesdropped by
receiver j, for i 6= j. If we treat the real and and imaginary
streams of transmitter i’s complex signals as two transmitters:
i1, i2, then the symbol i1 should be protected from that of i2
at the receiver side. However, the information of i1 received
at i2 is not a leakage because this corresponds to the scenario
when the imaginary part of the received signal of i contains
part of the real part of the transmit signal of i. Hence, the
extension of sDoF in complex channel from the real channel
is not trivial.
To achieve the desired complex sDoF, we observe that (i)
the transmit signals are improper signals, in our case pulse
amplitude modulation (PAM) and with different constellation
size in the real and imaginary part of the signals; (ii) widely-
linear processing should be applied at the relay. Improper
signals have essential applications in wireless communications
including a wide range of modulation techniques such as bina-
ry phase shift keying (BPSK), amplitude shift keying (ASK)
and Gaussian minimum-shift keying (GMSK). The term im-
proper describes statistical properties of complex signals. In
particular, improper signals are complex signals that have (i)
different power in the real and imaginary parts (I/Q imbalance)
and/or (ii) correlation between the real and imaginary parts.
Widely-linear processing are signal processing techniques that
take into consideration the complete second order statistics
of the signal, both the covariance and the pseudo-covariance
[7]. It is shown to achieve a smaller MSE in various systems
than conventional linear minimum MSE filter [8], [9] and is
incorporated into various standards including GSM [10], [11]
and 3GPP [12]. While most works on widely-linear techniques
[13] and references therein are applied on receive processing,
recently it is adopted in transmit filter design for performance
enhancement [14], [15]. Here, it is applied at the relay design
to enhance sDoF of the system.
B. Preliminary
Definition 1 ( [5]): The rational dimension of a set of
real numbers {h1, . . . hM} is m if there exists a set of real
numbers {H1, . . .Hm} such that each hi can be represented
as a rational combination of Hj’s, hi = αi1H1, . . . , αimHim
where αik ∈ Q for all k = 1, . . . ,m, where Q is the set of
rational numbers. In particular, {h1, . . . , hM} are rationally
independent if the rational dimension is M , i.e., none of the
numbers can be represented as a rational combination of other
numbers.
Lemma 1 ( [5], [6]): Lower bound of minimum distance
using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem: If a received constel-
lation of the following form
y = G0x+G1I + n
and the desired signal x and interference I are integers in a
PAM constellation set [−Q0, Q0] and [−Q1, Q1] respectively,
then by the Khintchine-Groshev theorem, the minimum distan-
ce between the received constellation points undergoing hard
decoding is lower bounded by
dmin >
κG0
max(Q0, Q1)1+ǫ
(1)
where κ, ǫ are constants. The corresponding error probability
is upper bounded by
Pe < exp
(
−
(κG0)
2
8σ2 max(Q0, Q1)2(1+ǫ)
)
. (2)
The variable σ2 defines the variance of the noise signal n.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume two transmitters where each transmitter aims to
transmit a secure message to its target receiver and is interested
in eavesdropping the message from the other user. These two
transmitters are assisted by a single-antenna relay. We assume
that the point-to-point links in the interference channel are
assisted by inherit layer-1 relays (simple repeaters), such as
in LTE systems. These repeaters are only capable of amplify-
and-forward and not able to adapt its forwarding strategies.
A smart relay is introduced to the system. The equivalent
network can be modeled as an instantaneous relay interference
channel (IRIC) in which the signals from the transmitters
through the smart relay and through the layer-1 relays arrive
at the receivers at the same time [16], [17], see Figure 4.
Denote the complex channel gain from transmitter i, i =
1, 2, to relay as fi and the complex channel from relay to
receiver i as gi. The complex transmit symbol from transmitter
i is denoted as xi with transmit power constraint P . The relay
received signal is yr =
∑2
k=1 fkxk+nr where the noise nr is
a circular Gaussian noise with identity matrix as covariance.
The received signal at receiver i is given by
yi =
2∑
k=1
(girfk + hik)xk + girnr + ni. (3)
Denote the achievable secrecy rate of transmitter-receiver pair
i as Rsi and Rrsi in systems with complex and real channel
coefficients respectively. The sum secure degrees-of-freedom
(sDoF) of a system with complex channel coefficients is given
by
Dcs = lim
P→∞
Rs1 +Rs2
log2 P
. (4)
In the case when the channel coefficients are real numbers,
the achievable sum sDoF is then given by
Drs = lim
P→∞
Rrs1 +Rrs2
1
2 log2 P
. (5)
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Fig. 1. A system model for a layer-1 relay-assisted single-user system.
The idea of real interference alignment is conventionally
applied to scenarios in which the channel coefficients are
real numbers. In the following we briefly review the known
results of sDoF on real IC. Then we apply the real interference
alignment technique to compute an achievable sDoF on real
IRIC. We then extend the sDoF results to the scenarios with
complex coefficients. We show that the achievable sDoF in
channels with complex coefficients with a layer-1 relay is only
2/3 whereas the proposed widely linear relay can achieve 1
sDoF.
A. sDoF of real IC with confidential messages, Drs = 2/3
We review briefly the sDoF results on two-user IC with
confidential messages with the application of real interference
alignment [6]. The received signal of receiver i, i = 1, 2, is
given by
yi = hiixi + hijxj + ni (6)
where j = 1, 2, j 6= i and the channel coefficients hij are real.
The transmitters transmit signals that are a weighted sum of
a data symbol ui and a noise symbol vi,
xi = ui +
hij
hii
vi. (7)
The symbols u1, u2, v1, v2 are all integer symbols chosen from
the constellation set [−Q,Q]. Note that the noise symbol
vi is used to protect the data from transmitter j, uj , from
being eavesdropped by receiver i. This can be applied in the
scenarios where the transmitters are trusted and cooperate to
prevent malicious receivers from eavesdropping. The received
signal yi can be written as
yi = hiiui + hij(uj + vi) +
hijhji
hjj
vj + ni. (8)
The symbols uj and vi are aligned at receiver i because
the sum of integers are also an integer and thus a valid
constellation point. At high SNR, the noise is dominated
and the received signal yi − ni is a linear sum of three
integer symbols weighted by real channel coefficients. From
Definition 1, the rational dimension of {hii, hij ,
hijhji
hjj
} is
three, as shown in Figure 2. It can be shown that the leakage
signal uj is masked by noise signal vi at receiver i, in a
subspace of dimension 1/3. Its data signal ui is retrieved
in 1/3 of real dimension and thus a total of Drs = 2/3 is
achieved.
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Fig. 2. The sDoFDrs = 2/3 of an interference channel with real coefficients
with confidential messages is achievable [6]. At receiver i, the desired symbol
ui is in a subspace of dimension 1/3 whereas the leakage symbol uj aligns
with noise symbol vi in a subspace of dimension 1/3 and the noise symbol
vj spans a dimension of 1/3.
B. sDoF of real IRIC, Drs = 1
Motivated by the result described in previous subsection,
we propose the following novel sDoF achievable scheme for
the real IRIC. In particular, the relay instead of performing
cooperative jamming, is chosen to neutralize one leakage link.
Without loss of generality, we choose the relay amplification
scalar r such that the information leakage from transmitter
one to receiver two is neutralized. The interference channel
reduces to a Z channel by setting the equivalent channel from
transmitter one to receiver two to zero:
g2rf1 + h21 = 0. (9)
Or equivalently, r = − h21g2f1 . Hence, the channel input-output
equation becomes
y1 = z11x1 + z12x2 + n1,
y2 = z22x2 + n2
(10)
where z11 = h11 −
h21g1
g2
, z12 = h12 −
h21g1f2
g2f1
and z22 =
h22 −
h21f2
f1
. Here we apply the idea of real interference
alignment [5]. The transmit signal x1 is a linear sum of a
desired signal u1 and a noise symbol v1 whereas x2 consists
of only the desired signal u2. All signals u1, v1, u2 are integers
in constellation set [−Q,Q]. The value of the constant Q
is chosen such that the constellation size scales with the
transmit power P ; consequently the minimum distance of the
constellation points at the receiver scales with P ; thus the
decoding error probability converges to zero when P goes to
infinity. Let
x1 = A
(
u1 +
z12
z11
v1
)
, x2 = Au2. (11)
The scalar A is chosen to satisfy the transmit power constraints
at the transmitters. The input-output relation becomes
y1 = A (z11u1 + z12(u2 + v1)) + n1,
y2 = Az22u2 + n2.
(12)
The noise signal v1 aligns with the information leakage u2 in
the sense that the sum of signals u2 + v1 is also an a valid
constellation point in a constellation [−2Q, 2Q] with enlarged
cardinality. The alignment scheme is shown in Figure 3.
1) Proof of achievablility of sDoF: Due to space limitation,
we can only provide the key steps in the following. From
Definition 1 we see that {z11, z12} are rationally independent
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Fig. 3. The sDoF Drs = 1 of a layer-1 relay assisted interference channel
with real coefficients with confidential messages is achievable. The layer-1
relay neutralizes a leakage link and converts the interference relay channel
to an equivalent Z channel. Transmitter two enjoys a leakage free channel
whereas the leakage symbol u2 aligns with noise symbol v1 at receiver one
in a subspace of dimension 1/2. The desired symbol is in a subspace of
dimension 1/2.
except for a subset of channel coefficients of probability zero.
t can be shown that the following secrecy rates are achievable:
Rrs1 = I(u1; y1)
Rrs2 = I(u2; y2)− I(u2; y1|u1).
(13)
We choose the constellation of u1, u2, v1 in (12) to be
Q = ⌊γP
1−ǫ
2(2+ǫ) ⌋ and the power normalization factor A =
P 1/2/Q. From Lemma 1, the error probability of decoding
u1 at receiver one goes to zero when P → ∞. The desired
mutual information can be lower bounded using the above
error probability lower bound [6],
I(u1; y1) >
1− ǫ
2(2 + ǫ)
(1− exp (−κ′P ǫ)) (log2 P + τ1)− 1
(14)
for some constant τ1. Thus, we see that the achievable sDoF
of transmitter-receiver pair one is given by
Drs1 = lim
P→∞
I(u1; y1)
0.5 log2 P
>
1
2
. (15)
Now we compute the achievable sDoF of transmitter-receiver
pair two. Note that there is no interference at receiver two.
Similar to the argument above, we obtain
I(u2; y2) >
1− ǫ
2(2 + ǫ)
(
1− exp
(
−κ2P
ǫ′
))
(log2 P + τ2)− 1
for some positive constants ǫ′, κ2, τ2. The leakage information
can be upper bounded in the following
I(u2; y1|u1) < I(u2;u2 + v1) ≤ log2(4Q)− log2(2Q) = 1.
Hence, the achievable sDoF of transmitter-receiver pair two is
given by
Drs2 = lim
P→∞
I(u2; y2)− I(u2; y1|u1)
0.5 log2 P
>
1
2
. (16)
The sDoF of transmitter-receiver pair two is only 1/2 despite
the fact that it enjoys an interference free AWGN channel.
The reason is that the constellation size of u2 chosen for
secrecy alignment at receiver one is smaller than what it
can be for the AWGN link alone. If the constellation size
for u2 is chosen to be too large, the noise signal v1 cannot
completely mask it and the data is no longer secure. The
total sDoF achievable is thus Drs = 1. An instantaneous
relay increases the sDoF of the system by 1/3. This result
draws parallels with the sDoF achievability scheme for an
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Fig. 4. A system model for the proposed optimum relay design for improper
source signals. The value Rij is the (i, j)-th element of the relay matrix R.
two-user interference channel with one helper [6] who sends
artificial noise to confuse eavesdroppers. On the other hand,
the instantaneous relay here is responsible for neutralizing a
leakage link, ensuring zero leakage without the assumption
of a wiretap code [18]. In the following, we investigate how
to extend the above results when the channel coefficients are
complex numbers.
III. WIDELY LINEAR RELAY PROCESSING
In this section, we extend the results above to scenarios
with complex channel coefficients. First we compute the
achievable sDoF of the complex IC assisted with a layer-
1 relay. Then we show that it is possible to improve the
achievable sDoF by applying widely linear relay processing
at the relay. The channel coefficients and transmit symbols
in (3) are assumed to be complex. We denote the covariance
matrix of xi = [Re(xi), Im(xi)]
T
as Qi = P˜iP˜
H
i . If xi is
circular, then Qi is a scaled identity matrix. To facilitate the
demonstration, we write xi = P˜i si where si has zero mean
and identity covariance matrix and P˜i is treated as a precoding
matrix over the real-valued domain. The equivalent real-valued
representation to (3) is written as
yi =
2∑
k=1
(GiRFk+Hik) P˜k xk +GiRnr +ni . (17)
which is shown in Figure 4. Denote |gi|, |fk|, |hik| as
the magnitudes of the channel realization gi, fk, hik and
φgi , φfk , φhik are the corresponding phase angles. The
real-valued channel matrices Fk, Gi and Hik are writ-
ten as, Fk = |fk|Jφfk , Gi = |gi|Jφgi and Hik =
|hik|Jφhik , where J(.) is a rotation matrix [19], J(θ) =
[cos(θ),− sin(θ); sin(θ), cos(θ)].
A. sDoF of complex IC with a layer-1 relay, Dcs = 2/3
With a layer-1 relay, the relay matrix R is given as
R = |r|J(φr) where |r| and φr are the magnitude and
phase angles of the complex relay amplification scalar. We
perform the same information leakage neutralization as in
(9), G2 RF1 +H21 = 02, by setting |r| =
|h21|
|g2||f1|
and
φr = φh21 −φf1 −φg2 . With the above specified relay matrix
R, denote the equivalent channel by H¯ij = Hij +GiRFj .
We choose the beamforming matrix to be P˜i = H¯
−1
ii . The
input-output relationship becomes
y1 = x1 +H¯12H¯
−1
22 x2 +G1 Rnr +n1
y2 = x2 +G2 Rnr +n2 .
(18)
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Fig. 5. The complex sDoF Dcs = 2/3 of a layer-1 relay assisted interference
channel with real coefficients with confidential messages is achievable. The
layer-1 relay neutralizes a leakage link and converts the interference relay
channel to an equivalent Z channel. Transmitter two enjoys a leakage free
channel. The complex channel is treated as a two-by-two real systems and
each transmitter i is able to securely transmit two real symbols ui1, ui2 with
each in a subspace of dimension 1/3.
Denote the matrix product H˜ = H¯12 H22, n˜i = GiRnr +ni
and the corresponding (i, j)-th element [.](i,j). Let the transmit
signals to be
x1 =
[
u11, u12 +
a[H˜](2,1)
[H˜](1,1)
v1 +
a[H˜](2,2)
[H˜](1,2)
v2
]T
x2 =
[
au21
[H˜](1,1)
,
au22
[H˜](1,2)
]T (19)
for a real scalar a. Receiver i decodes the signal from real yi1
and complex domain yi2 separately.
y11 = u11 + a(u21 + u22) + [n˜1](1) ,
y12 = u12 +
a[H˜](2,1)
[H˜](1,1)
(u21 + v1)
+
a[H˜](2,2)
[H˜](1,2)
(u22 + v2) + [n˜1](2) ,
y21 =
au21
[H˜](1,1)
+ [n˜2](1) ,
y22 =
au22
[H˜](1,2)
+ [n˜2](2) .
(20)
As shown in Figure 5, all the desired signals uij are secure
1.
The detailed proof follows the steps in Section II-B and is
omitted here due to space limit. At receiver one, the desired
signal u12 is a subspace of dimension 1/3 whereas the leakage
symbol u21 is protected by alignment with v1 and u22 is
protected by v2, each in a subspace of dimension 1/3. This
means that the dimensions of all desired signals uij are 1/3
and a total of Dcs = 2/3 is achieved.
B. sDoF of a complex IC with a widely linear relay, Dcs = 1
With widely linear relay processing, the relay matrix is
written in real-valued domain as R ∈ R2×2. This allows the
relay to scale and rotate the real and imaginary part of the
input signal differently. We choose the relay matrix R such
that the imaginary dimension from transmitter one to receiver
1Due to the statistical independence of u12 and u22, the alignment of
them is no different from aligning a secret message with an artificial noise
message. Hence a joint decoding of u12, u22 does not improve performance
of the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 6. The complex sDoF Dcs = 1 of a widely-linear relay assisted
interference channel with real coefficients with confidential messages is
achievable. The widely-linear relay neutralizes half of a leakage link for each
receiver. Each transmitter i transmits with improper signaling and is able
to securely transmit two real symbols ui1, ui2 with each in a subspace of
dimension 1/2.
two and the real dimension from transmitter two to receiver
one are neutralized,[
H¯21
]
(2,:)
= 01×2,
[
H¯12
]
(1,:)
= 01×2, (21)
Equivalently, we have
[H21](2,:) + [G2 RF1](2,:) = 01×2,
[H12](1,:) + [G1 RF2](1,:) = 01×2 .
(22)
Vectorize both sides and combine both criteria, we see that
the relay matrix satisfies
vec(R) = −
[
FT1 ⊗ [G2](2,:)
FT2 ⊗ [G1](1,:)
]−1  vec
(
[H21](2,:)
)
vec
(
[H12](1,:)
)

 .
Denote the equivalent second channel from source 2 to destina-
tion 1 as qT12 and the first channel from source 1 to destination
2 as qT21. The input-output equation in (17) becomes
y1 = P1 x1 +
[
01×2;q
T
12
]
H¯
−1
22 P2 x2 +G1 Rnr +n1,
y2 =
[
qT21;01×2
]
H¯
−1
11 P1 x1 +P2 x2 +G2 Rnr +n2 .
To simplify the notation, we denote q˜T12 = q
T
12 H¯
−1
22 . We
observe that at destination one, the desired signal x1 is spread
over both channels whereas the information leakage arrives
only at the second channel. We write the first and second
element of the received signal y1 as y11 and y12. Now, we
choose Pi = I2 and
x1 =
[
bx11
[q˜21](1)
,
bx12
[q˜21](2)
]T
, x2 =
[
ax21
[q˜12](1)
,
ax22
[q˜12](2)
]T
.
The received signal at destination one is given by
y11 =
bx11
[q˜21](1)
+ [n˜1](1)
y12 = x12 + a(x21 + x22) + [n˜1](2) .
(23)
The received signal at destination two can be written similarly
and thus is omitted here. As shown in Figure 6, transmitter i
only transmits desired symbols ui1, ui2. The receivers decode
the desired symbol in each domain. The leakage symbol is
protected by the unwanted symbol in that domain. We see
that each desired symbol is in a subspace of dimension 1/2
and a total of Dcs = 1 is achieved. The detailed proof follows
the steps in Section II-B and is omitted here due to space limit.
We have shown above an achievability scheme of sDoF
on complex IRIC. The advantages of the proposed scheme
is three-fold. First, it is an sDoF achievability scheme on
complex IRIC which is novel. Second, the proposed scheme
with widely linear relay achieves 1/3 higher sDoF than that of
layer-1 relay. Third, the proposed scheme is of higher power
efficiency over those on real channels as all the transmit power
here is spent on desired symbols and no power on noise
symbols.
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